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ABSTRACT
Rewards are defined by their behavioral functions in learn-
ing (positive reinforcement), approach behavior, economic
choices, and emotions. Dopamine neurons respond to
rewards with two components, similar to higher order sen-
sory and cognitive neurons. The initial, rapid, unselective
dopamine detection component reports all salient envi-
ronmental events irrespective of their reward association.
It is highly sensitive to factors related to reward and thus
detects a maximal number of potential rewards. It also
senses aversive stimuli but reports their physical impact
rather than their aversiveness. The second response com-
ponent processes reward value accurately and starts early
enough to prevent confusion with unrewarded stimuli and
objects. It codes reward value as a numeric, quantitative
utility prediction error, consistent with formal concepts of
economic decision theory. Thus, the dopamine reward
signal is fast, highly sensitive and appropriate for driving
and updating economic decisions. J. Comp. Neurol. 000:
000–000, 2015.
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Rewards are stimuli, objects, events, situations, and
activities with crucial biological functions for individual
survival and gene propagation. Specific behavioral
learning and decision tasks serve to assess the neuro-
nal underpinnings of reward functions. Individual neu-
rons signaling reward information are found in the
dopamine system, striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, amyg-
dala, and their associated structures. These reward
neurons process specific aspects of rewards such as
amount, probability, value, utility, and risk in forms suit-
able for economic decisions. Brain structures with
reward neurons often also contain neurons that process
aversive stimuli and punishment. Dopamine neurons do
not seem to be activated by punishers and code reward
value only in a positive monotonic manner, as results
from recent well-controlled experiments suggest.
This review elaborates on the properties of one of
the brain’s main reward systems, the dopamine neu-
rons. We describe the recently clarified specificity of its
signal to reward as opposed to other events. We then
relate the dopamine signal to formal economic decision
theory, which provides a stringent conceptual frame-
work for reward function. Specifically, we demonstrate
that the dopamine reward prediction error signal proc-




The body needs specific substances for survival,
including proteins, carbohydrates, fats, vitamins, electro-
lytes, and water, which are contained in foods and
liquids. To propagate their genes, individuals must mate,
reproduce, and raise offspring. Food and liquid rewards
subserve the alimentary needs. Different from common
associations of reward with bonus or happiness, the sci-
entific use of the term stresses three functions. Rewards
are positive reinforcers, they “make us come back for
more.” This function is captured most simply by Pavlov-
ian and operant conditioning. Furthermore, rewards are
attractive, generate approach behaviour, and serve as
arguments for economic decisions. This function is cru-
cially based on the stringently formalized term of
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REVIEW
economic utility. Finally, rewards are associated with
positive emotions, in particular with pleasure as a reac-
tion to something that turns out to be good, with desire
of something that is already known to be good, and with
happiness as a longer lasting state derived from pleasure
and desire (Schroeder,, 2004). Thus, a reward is a stimu-
lus, object, event, activity, or situation that induces posi-
tive learning, makes us approach and select it in
economic choices, and/or induces positive emotions.
The proximal reward functions of learning, approach,
and emotions serve the ultimate, distal function of
rewards, which is to increase evolutionary fitness. To
acquire and follow these primary alimentary and repro-
ductive rewards is the reason why the brain’s reward
system has evolved. Thus, the proximal reward func-
tions help the evolutionary selection of phenotypes that
maximize gene propagation.
Neuronal reward signals
Reward processing requires a large array of brain
functions from glia to synapses and channels. Investiga-
tions of neuronal reward processing consider that infor-
mation processing systems work with identifiable
signals that serve the rapid detection of important
events and lead to efficient behavioral actions. Although
many molecular and cellular approaches provide suffi-
cient spatial and temporal resolution, the action poten-
tials of individual neurons are often the most
appropriate neuronal signals for investigations involving
well-controlled behavioral actions. The rate of action
potentials (impulses/s) provides a code for neuronal
processing of reward information during behaviors
defined by concepts derived from experimental psychol-
ogy and experimental economics. It is thus possible to
identify reward neurons by studying action potentials in
relation to specific theoretical constructs (parameters)
of reward functions in learning and economic choices.
Reward prediction error signal
Dopamine neurons in the pars compacta of the sub-
stantia nigra and in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) show
a phasic neuronal signal that codes reward relative to its
prediction. A reward that is better than predicted gener-
ates a positive signal (increase in impulse rate), a fully pre-
dicted reward fails to generate a signal, and a reward that
is worse than predicted generates a negative signal
(decrease in impulse rate) (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz,
1998). The response occurs in the same prediction-
dependent way with conditioned, reward predicting stimuli
that themselves have acquired reward value (Enomoto
et al., 2011). This signal codes a reward prediction error
as conceptualized in major reinforcement models, such as
the Rescorla–Wagner rule (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972)
and temporal difference learning (Sutton and Barto,
1981). It follows formal theoretical criteria for prediction
error processing, namely, blocking (a stimulus not associ-
ated with a prediction error is blocked from behavioral
and neuronal learning; Waelti et al., 2001) and conditioned
inhibition (a stimulus associated with a negative prediction
error inhibits behavioral and neuronal responses; Tobler
et al., 2003). A positive dopamine response would
enhance coincident synaptic transmission in striatum,
frontal cortex, or amygdala neurons, and a negative
response would reduce synaptic transmission, thus direct-
ing individuals toward better rewards and away from
worse rewards and helping to maximize utility in economic
choices. Such a signal is also useful for learning and
updating of reward values.
The phasic reward prediction error signal occurs in
70–90% of dopamine neurons in a rather stereotyped
manner and shows only graded differences in latency,
duration, and magnitude between the neurons (Fiorillo
et al., 2013a). Some dopamine neurons show an addi-
tional, slower response that codes reward risk (Fiorillo
et al., 2003) and may affect the dopamine release
induced by the prediction error signal. Apparent more
complex relationships to cognitive processes can be
explained by reward prediction error coding with appro-
priate analysis (Ljungberg et al., 1992; Morris et al.,
2006; de Lafuente and Romo,, 2011; Enomoto et al.,
2011; Matsumoto and Takada,, 2013). There are also
minor activations or depressions before or during large
reaching movements (Schultz et al., 1983; Schultz, 1986;
Romo and Schultz, 1990), but neither with slightly differ-
ent arm movements (DeLong et al., 1983; Ljungberg
et al., 1992; Satoh et al., 2003) nor with licking or eye
movements (Waelti et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2012;
Stauffer et al., 2015), which might inconsistently reflect
general behavioral activation, attention, or risk rather
than the robust movement relationships deficient in
Parkinsonism. Distinct from these activities, dopamine
neurons are well known to show structural and functional
diversities similar to those of other neurons (e.g., Roeper,
2013). The dopamine release driven by the phasic
impulse responses is subject to local mechanisms, such
as cholinergic activity (Threlfell et al., 2012) and gluta-
mate co-release (Chuhma et al., 2014). Thus, the stereo-
typed dopamine prediction error signal may provide
locally differentiated influences on postsynaptic process-
ing. At slower time courses over minutes and hours,
dopamine impulse activity and dopamine release change
with a large range of behavior, including behavioral acti-
vation, forced inactivation, stress, attention, reward, pun-
ishment, and movement (Schultz, 2007). At the slowest
time course, tonic dopamine levels are finely regulated by
local presynaptic and metabolic mechanisms. Pathological
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and experimental deviations from these levels are asso-
ciated with Parkinson’s disease, schizophrenia, and
many other cognitive, motivational, and motor dysfunc-
tions. The implication of dopamine in these many func-
tions is less derived from the stereotyped phasic
dopamine reward signal and more from the specific
functions of the postsynaptic structures affected by
dopamine.
TWO-COMPONENT REWARD RESPONSES
Stimulus components and their sequential
processing
Rewarding stimuli, objects, events, situations. and
activities are composed of sensory components (visual,
auditory, somatosensory, gustatory. or olfactory), atten-
tional components (physical intensity, novelty, surprise.
and motivational impact). and motivational value
(reward). Neurons process these components in
sequential steps, which become well distinguishable
with increasing stimulus complexity. The occurrence of
a stimulus is initially detected by its physical impact
(Fig. 1A) and gives rise to subsequent processing of its
specific sensory properties, like spatial position, orien-
tation. and color, that identify the stimulus. As a last
step, maybe partly in parallel, neurons assess the moti-
vational value, which determines reward and punisher
function. Similar steps are assumed in models for mem-
ory retrieval and sensory decisions (Ratcliff, 1978;
Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008).
Whereas primary sensory systems may identify sim-
ple, undemanding stimuli at once and without apparent
Figure 1. Stimulus components and their neuronal processing. A: Scheme of sequential processing steps of individual stimulus compo-
nents. B: Time course of target discrimination during visual search in monkey frontal eye fields neuron. The response initially detects the
stimulus indiscriminately (blue zone) and only later differentiates between target and distractor (red). From Thompson et al. (1996). C: Dis-
tinction of initial indiscriminate detection response (blue) from main response component coding reward prediction error (red) in monkey
dopamine neurons during temporal discounting. Reward value increases from blue via orange and green to red, inversely with delays of 2,
4, 8, and 16 seconds. From Kobayashi and Schultz (2008). D: Better distinction of the two dopamine response components in more
demanding random dot motion discrimination task. Better dot motion discrimination with increasing motion coherence (0%, 50%) results in
increasing reward probability (from P 5 0.49 to P 5 0.99). Neuronal activity shows an initial, nondifferential increase (blue), a decrease
back to baseline, and then a second, graded increase reflecting reward value (due to increasing reward probability, red). Vertical dotted
line marks onset of discriminating ocular saccade and indicates that assessment of the reward value of the identified motion direction
requires several hundred milliseconds. From Nomoto et al. (2010).
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components, higher systems may process more complex
objects in the sequential steps just outlined. Thus, neu-
rons in the somatosensory barrel cortex, prefrontal cor-
tex, frontal eye fields, lateral intraparietal cortex, visual
cortex, and pulvinar show stepwise processing, consist-
ing of an initial, unselective detection response and a
subsequent, selective component that identifies the
specific stimulus in terms of orientation, motion, spatial
frequency, visual category, target–distractor distinction,
and figure–background distinction (Fig. 1B) (Thompson
et al., 1996; Ringach et al., 1997; Kim and Shadlen,
1999; Roelfsema et al., 2007; Lak et al., 2010).
Reward-processing neurons in the amygdala, primary
visual cortex, and inferotemporal cortex show similar
distinct processing steps that comprise an initial, unse-
lective stimulus detection and a subsequent reward val-
uation (Paton et al., 2006; Mogami and Tanaka,, 2006;
Ambroggi et al., 2008; Stanisor et al., 2013). Thus,
higher neuronal systems are well known to process
detection, identification, and valuation of stimuli in iden-
tifiable sequential steps.
Two dopamine response components
Like other neurons processing complex information,
dopamine neurons process reward components sequen-
tially. Any reward with sufficient physical intensity may
elicit two response components (Fig. 1C,D). The first
response component consists of an unselective
increase of activity (“activation”) and occurs with any
stimulus irrespective of being associated with reward,
punishment, or nothing. It reflects the detection of the
event without coding its value. It occurs also as striatal
dopamine release, without distinguishing between
reward-predicting and reward-nonpredicting stimuli (Day
et al., 2007). The subsequent, second response compo-
nent reflects the reward value of a reward-predicting
stimulus or a reward and codes positive and negative
reward prediction errors in a graded manner. These
components are difficult to separate when the reward
is simple and undemanding and can be rapidly identi-
fied and valued (Fig. 1C) (Steinfels et al., 1983; Schultz
and Romo, 1990; Ljungberg et al., 1992; Horvitz et al.,
1997; Fiorillo et al., 2013b; Fiorillo, 2013). They
become more distinct with more demanding reward-
predicting stimuli, such as moving dots that take longer
to identify and value (Fig. 1D) (Nomoto et al., 2010),
and with primary rewards whose amount is determined
by liquid flow duration (onset of liquid flow elicits an ini-
tial activation that persists only with larger amounts;
Lak et al., 2014). Thus, dopamine responses consist of
two components with different properties, which will
now be discussed.
High sensitivity of initial response
component
The initial activating response is enhanced by several
factors, including physical stimulus intensity (Fiorillo
et al., 2013a,b). Furthermore, a mechanism called gener-
alization induces or enhances the response to an unre-
warded stimulus, even a punisher, if that stimulus
physically resembles a rewarded stimulus (Waelti et al.,
2001; Tobler et al., 2003). For example, visual aversive
stimuli rarely elicit activations when the alternating
rewarded stimulus is auditory, but the unchanged aver-
sive stimulus is very effective in inducing substantial
activations when both stimuli are visual and thus resem-
ble each other (Fig. 2) (Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1996).
Such generalization is also seen with striatal dopamine
release (Day et al., 2007). The initial response also
increases in contexts in which rewards are known to
occur (here, “context” refers specifically to all environ-
mental stimuli and events except the explicit, differential
stimulus). Small, unrewarded stimuli elicit no or only
small dopamine activations before learning (Tobler et al.,
2003) or in unrewarded contexts, but are very effective
in well-controlled rewarded environments (Fig. 2)
(Kobayashi and Schultz, 2014). The initial activation also
increases with stimulus novelty (Ljungberg et al., 1992),
although novelty alone without sufficient stimulus inten-
sity is ineffective (Tobler et al., 2003). Thus, the initial,
unselective detection response component is highly sen-
sitive to factors related to rewards.
Salience, but only initially
The factors generating and enhancing the initial
dopamine activation are likely endowed with stimulus-
driven salience. Intense stimuli elicit attention through
their noticeable physical impact, which is called physi-
cal salience. Rewards not only carry positive value but
also induce attention due to their important biological
functions, called motivational salience. (Biologically
important punishers carry negative value but also
induce motivational salience.) Thus, stimuli that resem-
ble rewards physically (generalization) or that occur in
environments in which rewards are known to occur
(reward context) are associated with motivational sali-
ence, even before they have been identified as rewards.
Finally, novel stimuli, even if they require identification
and comparison with previously experienced stimuli, are
surprising and thus draw attention, suggesting that they
are endowed with novelty/surprise salience. Thus, the
initial dopamine activation is sensitive to salience.
Despite this activation, the phasic dopamine
response is not just a salience response, as is some-
times assumed (Kapur, 2003). The salience activation is
W.R. Stauffer et al.
4 The Journal of Comparative Neurology |Research in Systems Neuroscience
rapidly followed by the second response component,
which codes reward value as a graded, bidirectional
reward prediction error (Fig. 1C,D). The second compo-
nent is also invisible when an unrewarded stimulus
occurs unpredictably; the lack of prediction error (no
reward minus no prediction) would explain the absence
of the second component, and the whole dopamine
response consists only of the initial, detection compo-
nent. This may be the reason why initial studies that did
not use rewards interpreted the whole phasic dopamine
response as if it were primarily coding salience (Steinfels
et al., 1983; Horvitz et al., 1997), an interpretation
strengthened by its short latency (Redgrave et al.,
1999). The second component itself does not code sali-
ence, as the very salient negative reward prediction
errors and conditioned inhibitors do not induce any acti-
vation (Schultz, 1998; Tobler et al., 2003). Aversive
dopamine responses (Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1996;
Joshua et al., 2008; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009)
might simply constitute the first component enhanced
by physical salience, reward generalization, and context
(see below). Thus, dopamine neurons seem to code sali-
ence only as an initial activation, which might appear as
their prime response with incomplete testing.
Benefits from the initial response
component
The initial dopamine detection response component
is very fast and occurs at latencies below 100 millisec-
onds. It is also very unselective, as it occurs not only
with rewards but also with all kinds of unrewarded stim-
uli and even with punishers. Such a fast response
allows brain mechanisms to start initiating behavioral
reactions already before the stimulus has been fully
identified and valued. If the stimulus turns out to be a
reward, the behavioral initiation can proceed, rather
than starting only at this moment. If it is not a reward,
it is early enough to cancel the behavioral initiation and
prevent errors (see below). Thus, no time is wasted by
waiting for valuation, resulting in the quickest possible
behavioral initiation.
The unselectivity of the initial response ensures a
wide, polysensory sensitivity to all possible stimuli and
objects that may be rewards. The additional sensitivity
to stimulus intensity, similarity, reward context, and
novelty further increases the chance to detect a reward
and prevent missing it. It seems better to overdetect
rewards than to underdetect them, as long as costly
behavioral errors can be avoided (see below). Thus,
dopamine neurons already process potential rewards
before their reward nature has been confirmed or
rejected.
The coding of physical, motivational, and novelty/sur-
prise salience would be beneficial for decision-making
and behavioral learning (Pearce and Hall, 1980). Atten-
tion is well known to enhance the neuronal processing
of stationary and moving visual stimuli (Bushnell and
Goldberg, 1981; Treue and Maunsell, 1996) and visual
Figure 2. High sensitivity of initial dopamine detection response component. Left: Enhancement by reward generalization. In the red trials,
both rewarded and aversive conditioned stimuli are visual. In the blue trials (covering large parts of red trials except the peak), the condi-
tioned aversive stimulus remains visual, but the rewarded conditioned stimulus is auditory. The activating response to the identical visual
aversive stimulus is higher when the rewarded stimulus is also visual (red peak) rather than auditory (blue), demonstrating response
enhancement by sensory similarity with rewarded stimulus. The blue activity depression reflects the second component. From Mirenowicz
and Schultz (1996). Right: Enhancement by reward context. Left: in an experiment that separates unrewarded from rewarded contexts,
dopamine neurons show only small activations to unrewarded large and small pictures (blue and black; red: response to liquid reward).
Three distinct contexts are achieved by three well-separated trial blocks, three different background pictures, and removal of liquid spout
in the picture trial types (center and bottom, blue and black). Right: by contrast, in an experiment using a common reward context without
these separations, dopamine neurons show substantial activations to unrewarded large and small pictures. Each of the six picture pairs
shows the trial background on a large computer monitor (left) and the continuing background together with the specific reward or super-
imposed picture (right). Each of the six neuronal traces shows the average population response from 31–33 monkey dopamine neurons.
From Kobayashi and Schultz (2014).
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orienting (Nardo et al., 2011). The brief dopamine sali-
ence signal is likely to enhance in a similar way the
neuronal processing of reward prediction error by the
second component.
Thus, the fast and highly sensitive, unselective initial
dopamine detection response is appropriate for very
rapidly detecting a maximal number of rewards and for
missing only a few, thus contributing to maximal reward
acquisition, which in the long run is evolutionarily
beneficial.
Correct reward valuation by the second
response component
Once assessed by the second reward prediction error
component, which is particularly distinctive with more
demanding stimuli (Fig. 1D; Nomoto et al., 2010), the
value information remains present until the reward
occurs. This becomes evident when a known test
reward elicits a reward prediction error; a surprising
reward following an unrewarded stimulus elicits a posi-
tive reward prediction error and a corresponding dopa-
mine activation (Fig. 3; Waelti et al., 2001).
The period of valuation precedes the behavioral reac-
tions toward the reward (Fig. 3). Postsynaptic neurons
downstream to dopamine neurons are likely to “see”
both dopamine response components, but they receive
the value information from the second component early
enough to allow correct behavioral reactions. This mech-
anism may explain why animals don’t often confuse
rewards with nonrewards and punishers; despite neuro-
nal generalization to unrewarded stimuli, they do not
generalize in their behavioral reactions (Mirenowicz and
Schultz, 1996; Day et al., 2007; Joshua et al., 2008).
Thus, by occurring early enough for appropriate behav-
ioral reactions, the second response component pre-
vents major negative effects that might derive from the
early onset and unselectivity of the first response com-
ponent, thus resulting in a positive tradeoff between ben-
efits for reward acquisition and its costs.
No aversive activation
Dopamine neurons are activated by aversive stimuli
(Tsai et al., 1980; Schultz and Romo, 1987; Mirenowicz
and Schultz, 1996; Guarraci and Kapp, 1999). However,
these activations reflect the physical intensities of the
aversive stimuli rather than their negative value; keep-
ing physical impact constant and increasing the bitter-
ness of a liquid solution increase the measured
behavioral aversiveness but reduce the dopamine acti-
vation (Fig. 4) (Fiorillo et al., 2013b). Purely aversive
stimuli with low intensity induce only depressant
responses, reflecting either negative punisher value or
negative prediction error from reward omission (Fiorillo,
2013). Thus, «aversive» dopamine activations may rep-
resent the initial, unselective dopamine response com-
ponent. Correspondingly, this activation is increased by
reward generalization (Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1996).
Recent rediscoveries of «aversive» dopamine activations
have not considered these physical and generalization
confounds, which may also explain the paradoxical,
more frequent responses to conditioned than primary
stimuli, nor have they checked for potential contribution
from the rewarded context in which these tests were
Figure 3. Accurate dopamine value coding after initial detection response. Both rewarded and unrewarded conditioned stimuli (CS1,
CS2) elicit a common initial increase of neuronal activity (blue). This activation continues after the CS1 (top, red), but turns into a
depression after the CS2 (bottom, red). In CS1 trials, the fully predicted reward elicits no response (no prediction error, right), whereas
in CS2 trials, a surprising (identical) test reward induces an activation (positive prediction error). Thus, correct, positive or negative reward
value coding begins immediately after the common initial response and early enough for initiating corresponding behavioral reactions
(green arrow); correct value coding continues until the time of reward (red arrow). From Waelti et al. (2001).
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conducted (Joshua et al., 2008; Matsumoto and Hiko-
saka, 2009). Stronger activations with higher punish-
ment probability (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009) may
derive from salience differences or anticipatory relief
with punishment termination or avoidance (Budygin
et al., 2012; Oleson et al., 2012) that are considered
rewarding (Solomon and Corbit, 1974; Gerber et al.,
2014). Thus, when all confounds are accounted for,
dopamine neurons are not activated by the aversive
value of punishers (Fiorillo et al., 2013b). Response var-
iations among neurons may reflect graded sensitivity
differences of the initial response component to physi-
cal intensity, generalization, and context (Fiorillo et al.,
2013a), rather than two categorically distinct types of
dopamine neurons (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009).
Thus, aversive stimuli may induce the initial, unselective
dopamine response component through their salience,
but neither the first nor the second dopamine response
component seems to code punishment. Nevertheless,
as neighboring non-dopamine neurons code punishment
(Cohen et al., 2012), a few dopamine neurons might
receive aversively coding collateral afferents.
Sufficient and necessary functions in
learning and approach
Electrical and optogenetic activation of dopamine
neurons elicits place preference, nose poking, lever
pressing, choice preferences, spatial navigation, rota-
tion, locomotion, and unblocking of learning (Corbett
and Wise, 1980; Tsai et al., 2009; Witten et al., 2011;
Steinberg et al., 2013; Arsenault et al., 2014). Corre-
spondingly, optogenetically induced direct or transsy-
naptic inhibition of dopamine neurons induces place
dispreference learning (Tan et al., 2012; van Zessen
et al., 2012; Ilango et al., 2014). The activation and
inhibition of dopamine neurons apparently mimics posi-
tive and negative reward prediction error signals, sug-
gesting a sufficient role of phasic dopamine signals in
learning and approach. Habenula stimulation induces
place dispreference, either by activating supposedly
aversive dopamine neurons (Lammel et al., 2012) or by
transsynaptically inhibiting dopamine neurons (Stopper
et al., 2015), although the limited specificity of the
TH:cre mice used (Lammel et al., 2015) and the known
habenula inhibition of dopamine neurons (Matsumoto
and Hikosaka, 2007) make the latter mechanism more
likely. Dopamine receptor stimulation also seems nec-
essary for these functions. Systemic dopamine receptor
antagonists reduce simple stimulus–reward learning in
rats (Flagel et al., 2011), and local D1 receptor antago-
nist injections into the frontal cortex impair behavioral
and neuronal learning and memory in monkeys (Sawa-
guchi and Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Puig and Miller, 2012).
N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor knockout
reduces dopamine burst responses, simple learning,
and behavioral reactions (Zweifel et al., 2009). Thus,
the phasic dopamine signal is both causal and neces-
sary for inducing learning and approach, allowing for
the possibility that natural dopamine activations influ-
ence these behaviors.
Through diverging axonal projections, the dopamine
response may act as a global reinforcement signal
within a triad of low-affinity D1 receptors located on
dendritic spines of striatal neurons that are also con-
tacted by cortical axons (Freund et al., 1984; Schultz,
1998). D1 receptor activation is necessary for long-
term potentiation in the striatum (Pawlak and Kerr,
2008). Stimulation of dopamine D1 receptors prolongs
striatal membrane depolarizations (Hernandez-Lopez
et al., 1997), which may underlie the immediate focus-
ing effect of dopamine on behavior. Thus, the synaptic
dopamine actions, despite their heterogeneity (Threlfell
et al., 2012: Roeper, 2013; Chuhma et al., 2014), are
overall consistent with the behavioral dopamine func-
tions in learning and approach.
SUBJECTIVE VALUE AND ECONOMIC
UTILITY
Objective or subjective value
The proximal function of reward is survival and repro-
duction of the individual gene carrier. Thus, reward
Figure 4. Phasic activation of dopamine neurons to aversive stim-
ulus reflects physical salience rather than aversiveness. The
increased aversiveness generated by the more concentrated bit-
ter decatonium solution decreases the dopamine response (physi-
cal impact of liquid delivery remains constant), suggesting an
inverse relationship between aversiveness and dopamine activa-
tion. The increased depression from the higher aversiveness
reduces the activation generated by the physical stimulation from
the liquid drops. Average population responses from 19 and 14
monkey dopamine neurons, respectively. From Forillo et al.
(2013b).
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value is subjective. What is important for me may not
be that important for everybody. Thus, the objective,
physical value a reward has for an individual, like liquid
volume or money, depends on how much it enhances
her well-being. A millionaire walks less readily a mile to
save a £ 2 bus fare than a student. Although rats nor-
mally don’t drink salt solutions, they will do so after
salt deprivation (Robinson and Berridge, 2013). Thus,
although physically bigger rewards are usually better,
their subjective value increases to varying extents
depending on the needs of the individual decision
maker.
Subjective value signal
The phasic dopamine value response increases with
increasing objective, physical reward parameters includ-
ing amount, probability, and statistically expected value
(Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). However,
physical reward value also depends on the molecules in
the reward, which differ between different reward types
and substances. Therefore, the values of different
reward objects are inherently difficult to assess from
physical properties, and subjective reward values
inferred from behavioral choices should be used as
regressors for neuronal responses. Indeed, choices
reveal subjective preference rankings between rewards
that cannot be inferred from objective, physical param-
eters or do not share common dimensions, such as dif-
ferent or multicomponent reward types. Dopamine
responses follow closely the ranked preferences among
liquid and food rewards (Fig. 5A) (Lak et al., 2014) and
reflect the arithmetic sum of positive and negative val-
ues from rewards and punishers (Fiorillo, 2013). Fur-
thermore, risk affects subjective value. Most monkeys
are risk seekers with small rewards, preferring risky
over safe rewards of the same expected value, whereas
others are risk neutral. Dopamine responses follow
closely the subjective risk-enhanced subjective value
during risk-seeking behavior and, correspondingly, are
stronger with binary, equiprobable gambles than with
safe rewards of identical expected value (Fig. 5B) (Lak
et al., 2014). By contrast, dopamine responses are
unaffected by risk during risk-neutral behavior. Like-
wise, striatal voltammetric dopamine responses are
higher or lower to identical gambles than to safe
rewards depending on risk-seeking or -avoiding atti-
tudes of rats (Sugam et al., 2012). Thus, closely corre-
sponding to behavioral choices, dopamine neurons
signal the subjective value derived from different
rewards and from risk on a common currency scale.
However, these behavioral methods do not allow us to
derive subjective value as a function of objective value
in a straightforward manner.
Figure 5. Dopamine neurons code subjective rather than objective reward value. A: Neuronal coding of common currency subjective value.
Stimulus responses follow preferences among different liquid and food rewards. Rewards were different quantities of blackcurrant juice
(top: blue) and a liquified mixture of banana, chocolate, and hazelnut food (yellow banana). Color bars below rewards at top refer to color
of neuronal responses, and curved arrows indicate behavioral preferences assessed in binary behavioral choices between the indicated
rewards. B: Increase of stimulus responses with risky compared with safe rewards (vertical arrows). Blue and green colors indicate black-
currant juice (more preferred 5 higher value) and orange juice (less preferred 5 lower value), respectively; S and R indicate safe reward
amounts and binary, equiprobable gambles between two reward amounts of the same reward juice with identical expected value, respec-
tively. A and B from Lak et al. (2014). C: Temporal discounting: decreasing responses of dopamine neurons to stimuli predicting increasing
reward delays of 2–16 seconds (red), corresponding to subjective value decrements measured by intertemporal choices (blue), contrasted
with constant physical amount (black). Y-axis shows behavioral value and neuronal responses in % of reward amount at 2-second delay
(0.56 ml). From Kobayashi and Schultz (2008).
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Temporal discounting
Rewards delivered with a longer delay after a stimu-
lus or an action lose their value. Psychophysical assess-
ment of intertemporal choices between early and
delayed rewards reveal hyperbolic or exponential decay
of subjective reward value over delays of 2 to 16 sec-
onds (Fig. 5C, blue) (Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008),
thus relating subjective value to the physical measure
of delay. Correspondingly, monkey dopamine responses
to delay-predicting stimuli decay progressively, despite
constant physical reward amount (Fig. 5C, red), as do
voltammetric dopamine responses in rat nucleus
accumbens (Day et al., 2010). Dopamine prediction
error responses at reward time increase correspond-
ingly with longer delays. Thus, dopamine neurons code
subjective value as a mathematical function of objective
delay. However, temporal discounting is a specific case
that does not afford a general method for deriving sub-
jective value from objective value irrespective of time.
Formal economic utility
Expected utility theory makes one further and impor-
tant step in the construction of subjective value.
Whereas the choice preferences described so far allow
only the ranking of subjective values, and temporal dis-
counting is specific for delays, utility functions derived
from choices under risk define numeric subjective value
as mathematical functions of objective, physical reward.
In providing numerically defined interval ratios, utility
functions constitute mathematical approximations of
the preference structure with unique shapes that are
meaningful up to positive affine transformations (y 5 a
1 bx) (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Savage,
1954; Debreu, 1959; Kagel et al., 1995). This formal
definition of utility does not rely on other factors influ-
encing subjective value such as reward type, delay, or
effort cost, which are all contributors to utility but not
essential in this construction. Thus, the expected utility
model is a highly constrained, well-defined form of
Figure 6. Dopamine neurons code formal economic utility. A: Positive utility prediction error responses to unpredicted juice rewards
(black), superimposed on nonlinear utility function in same monkey (red). Psychophysically varied behavioral choices between a variable
safe reward and a specific binary, equiprobable gamble (P 5 0.5 each outcome) served to assess its certainty equivalent (subjective value
of gamble indicated by amount of safe reward at choice indifference); the certainty equivalents of specifically placed gambles served to
estimate the utility function according to the structured “fractile” procedure (Caraco et al., 1980; Machina, 1987). B: Top: three condi-
tioned stimuli indicating three binary, equiprobable gambles (0.1–0.4 ml; 0.5–0.8 ml; 0.9–1.2 ml juice); bar height specifies juice volume.
In pseudorandom alternation, one of these stimuli is shown to the animal, followed 1.5 seconds later by one of the two specified juice vol-
umes. Bottom: nonlinear utility function (same as in A). Delivery of higher reward in each gamble generates identical positive physical pre-
diction error (0.15 ml, red, black and blue dots). However, due to different positions on the utility function, the prediction errors vary
nonmonotonically in utility (Du). Shaded areas indicate physical volumes (horizontal) and utilities (vertical) of gambles. C: Dopamine coding
of utility prediction error (same animal as in B). The red, black, and blue traces indicate responses to the higher outcomes of the three
gambles shown as colored fat dots in B (0.4 ml, 0.8 ml, 1.2 ml). These responses reflect the positive utility prediction errors that vary
according to the slope of the utility function (Du in B), rather than the identical positive physical prediction errors of 10.15. A–C from
Stauffer et al. (2014).
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subjective value measured solely from choices under
risk. The nonlinear relationship between utility, u(x), and
objective value, x, derives from increasing or decreasing
marginal utility, which is the utility derived from one
additional unit of consumption (Bernoulli, 1738). Utility
functions with these numerical properties can be com-
pared with neuronal responses to rewards, to identify
neuronal utility functions n(x) that code reward in these
strict quantitative economic terms.
Neuronal utility signal
Methods for estimating cardinal utility functions are
based on concepts employing gambles (von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944). Binary, equiprobable gambles
(P 5 0.5 each outcome) constitute the most simple
and controlled risk tests identified by economic deci-
sion theory (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). When the
fractile method with choices between risky and safe
outcomes (Caraco et al., 1980; Machina, 1987) is used,
monkeys’ choices reveal utility functions that are ini-
tially convex with small rewards (risk seeking, below
0.4–0.6 ml of blackcurrant juice), then linear, and then
concave with larger amounts (risk avoiding) (Fig. 6A,
red), amounting to initially increasing and then decreas-
ing marginal utility (Stauffer et al., 2014). Although
these functions look similar among the limited number
of monkeys tested, economic theory prohibits their
quantitative comparison between individuals.
The dopamine reward prediction error signal reflects
the nonlinear shape of measured utility functions
(Stauffer et al., 2014). With free, unpredicted rewards,
utility prediction errors increase in a nonlinear fashion
defined by the measured utility function, and dopamine
responses show a very similar nonlinear increase with
increasing amounts of unpredicted reward and thus cor-
relate well with those utility prediction errors (Fig. 6A).
Binary gambles result in positive prediction errors for
the larger reward outcome and negative errors for the
smaller reward. In three gambles with the same physi-
cal range (60.15 ml), physically identical prediction
errors induce nonlinear changes in utility (due to non-
monotonic marginal utility) (Fig. 6B top, gray rectan-
gles). Dopamine prediction error responses to the
higher gamble outcomes mimic the nonmonotonic
changes in the utility slope and correlate well with the
increments on the utility axis (Fig. 6C). With all other
contributions to utility kept constant, including reward
type, delay, and cost, these data suggest the coding of
a prediction error in income utility by dopamine neu-
rons. Thus, the dopamine reward prediction error
response is, specifically, a utility prediction error signal
that reflects marginal utility, and the strictest and most
theory-constrained definition of reward value applies to
the dopamine coding of reward.
Although utility is a measure of subjective value, a
neuronal utility signal reflecting a mathematical function
of objective value goes well beyond subjective value
coding derived from simple behavioral preferences.
Thus, the identification of a dopamine utility prediction
error signal suggests that the enigmatic and elusive util-
ity, whose mere existence is often questioned by econ-
omists, is implemented in the brain as a physical,
measurable signal.
CONCLUSIONS
The description of the phasic dopamine reward pre-
diction error signal in the substantia nigra and ventral
tegmental area has advanced in terms of two major
points, the component structure of the signal and the
form of reward information conveyed. Dopamine neu-
rons show two response components, analogous to
neurons in higher order sensory and cognitive brain
regions. The initial component consists of a fast
increase in activity (activation) that is unselective and
highly sensitive to factors related to rewards. It detects
all environmental stimuli of sufficient physical intensity,
including rewards, unrewarded stimuli, and punishers,
and transiently codes several forms of salience until the
second response component appears. Activations by
punishers reflect physical impact rather than aversive-
ness. Through the early onset, unselectivity, high sensi-
tivity, and beneficial salience effects on neuronal
processing, the initial response enhances the speed,
efficacy, and accuracy of reward processing, and thus
reward acquisition. The second response component
codes subjective reward value derived from different
rewards and delays. Further tests using behavioral tools
from economic decision theory suggest that this com-
ponent constitutes a utility prediction error signal. With
the dual component structure, the dopamine signal
detects rewards at the earliest possible moment and
allows behavioral initiation mechanisms to begin already
while the rewards are still being identified; the subse-
quent value response occurs early enough to prevent
confusion with unrewarded and aversive objects. This is
a very interesting computational mechanism for effi-
ciently reacting to external stimuli. Stimulation and
lesion experiments suggest that the phasic dopamine
signal is sufficient and necessary for driving behavioral
actions. With its formal utility coding, the dopamine sig-
nal constitutes the first known neuronal utility signal
that is directly compatible with basic foundations of
economic decision theory; it constitutes a biological
W.R. Stauffer et al.
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implementation of utility, which for economists is purely
theoretical.
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